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CASENOTES
eventually destroy the whole minimum price structure. And, since the
Fair Trade Act applies solely to commodities "in free and open com-
petition with commodities of the same general class," 19 selling the product
to the retailer only on condition that he sign a minimum price contract
would be equally ineffective. He could simply refuse and buy the same
product from a rival producer. Neither could all producers combine
together to force minimum price contracts on the retailers, for this
would constitute a "horizontal" agreement in restraint of trade and would
subject them to the penalties of the anti-trust laws. 20 And, as a matter
of fact, the Florida Supreme Court has indicated, without ever having
had occasion to decide the question, that it might consider even voluntary
fair trade agreements invalid, as representing a denial of the principle
that "all shall stand equal before the law."'2 1
Assuredly therefore, with such a solid array of judicial precedent
and opinion mitigating against it, the Florida Fair Trade Act is, for all
practical purposes, no longer of any effect in this state.
David Edward Emanuel.
TAXATION-REFUNDS-LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
Plaintiff brought an original mandamus proceeding to recover use
taxes paid under a Florida statute which subsequently was judicially
determined to be unconstitutional. Plaintiff bases his right to recovery
on another statute3 which authorizes the comptroller to make such a
refund ". . . if the claim be filed within one year after the right to
such refund shall have accrued . . . ." This action was begun less than
one year after the original statute was declared unconstitutional, and
more than two years after the last payment of the tax. Held, that the
right to refund accrued at time of payment of taxes, not at the time the
statute was determined to be invalid; and the refund claim, not having
been filed within one year from such accrual, was barred. State ex rel.
Victor Chemical Works v. Gay, Comptroller, 74 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1954).
One of the most controversial subjects in the field of taxation is that
of tax refunds. About the only point upon which most courts agree is
that there can be no recovery for illegal taxes voluntarily paid, in the
19. FLA. STAT., § 541.03(l) (1953).
20. Jayne v. Loder, 149 Fed. 21 (3rd Cir. 1906).
21. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 376 (Fla.
1949) (Concurring opinion by Barns, J.).
1. FLA. LAws 1949, c. 26319.
2. Thompson v. Intercounty Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1952).
3. FA. STAT. § 215.26 (1943).
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absence of state authorization through a valid 4 statute. 5  The right to
refund is so dependent upon the authorizing statute, that, if the statute
is repealed while refund actions are pending, the actions are terminated
and the right to recovery no longer exists.6  The general rule with regard
to taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute is that the payment is
voluntary, 7 and the taxpayer is precluded from recovery in the absence
of. an authorizing refund statute.8
Since statutory authorization is an integral part of the right to a
refund, the right granted thereunder must be exercised in the manner
provided by the statute,9 and when the statute conditions the right on
the bringing of an action within a certain time from the date of payment,
the court can not entertain an action brought after that time.10 When
no time limit is specified in the refund statute, the statute of limitations
generally runs from the time the taxes are paid, and is not postponed
until the legality of the tax has been judicially determined," or until the
taxpayer discovers that the assessment, levy or collection is illegal. 12
In the event of uncertainty in the terms of a statute concerning tax
refunds, some courts hold that such statutes are remedial and must be
liberally construed;" ' whereas others hold that such statutes are in deroga-
tion of the common law and must be strictly construed. 4  In the case
of Bonwit Teller and Co. v. United States," the United States Supreme
Court said that a statute permitting recovery of an overpayment of taxes
should be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer to give the relief
the statute was intended to provide. The rule of construction of tax
statutes in Florida is aptly stated in Walgreen Drug Stores v. Lee' which
related that it is a "well settled rule of tax statute construction that, if
the text of the act does not reveal with certainty the intent of the Legis-
laturc and it is susceptible of two meanings, that meaning most favorable
to the taxpayers should be adopted."
The majority of the court in the instant case considered the question
of accrual as unambiguous, and therefore saw no necessity for further
4. People ex rel. City of Highland Park v. McKibben, 380 Ill. 447, 44 N.E.2d
449 (1942).
5. Curry v. Johnston, 242 Ala. 319, 6 So.2d 397 (1942); Mississippi Cent.
R.R. Co. v. City of Hattiesburg, 163 Miss. 311, 141 So. 897 (1932); Piedmont Memorial
Hospital v. Guilford County, 221 N.C. 308, 20 S.E.2d 332 (1942).
6. Southern Service Co. v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 2d 1, 97 P.2d 963 (1940).
7. Richardson Lubricating Co. v. Kinney, 337 Ill. 122, 168 N.E. 886 (1929).
8. Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U.S. 253 (1904); Carr v. Memphis, 22
F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1927); Standard Oil Co. v. Bollinger, 337 Ill. 353, 169 N.E. 236
( Re Morris Blatt et al., 41 NM. 269, 67 P.2d 293 (1937),
10. Ibid.
11. Leslie v. City of Dallas, 172 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
12. Covington v. Voskotter, 80 Ky. 219 (1882); Leslie v. City of Dallas, 172
S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
13. San Joaquin Ginning Co. v. McColgan, 20 Cal. 2d 254, 125 P.2d 36 (1942).
14. Arrot v. Allegheny County, 328 Pa. 293, 194 AtI. 910 (1937).
15. 283 U.S. 258 (1931).
16. 158 Fla. 260, 28 So.2d 535 (1946).
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investigation into legislative intent. The dissent, on the other hand,
considered the statute too indefinite and reached its conclusion strictly
on the basis of construction of an ambiguous tax statute. The majority
relied heavily on the case of State ex rel. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay"
in which the facts were similar to those of the instant case. There the
court held that the taxpayer's rights were barred by the time limitation
set forth in the same statute with which we are here concerned. The
dissent in the instant case dismisses the Tampa Electric case by pointing
out that in that decision the right of the taxpayer grew out of the judicial
construction of a valid statute, and not from the determination that the
taxing statute was unconstitutional. The dissent relies upon Walgreen
Drug Store Co. v. Lee'" and what it considers the obvious intent of the
lawmaking body.
It appears that the taxpayer was dealt with rather harshly in the
instant case. It does not seem logical that the legislature, having
envisaged a situation such as this, would have intended the right to refund
to accrue as of the date of payment, but rather when the statute was
declared unconstitutional. Plaintiff paid the tax willingly, and thus could
not bring an action for a refund until he was given statutory authorization,
unless he brought an action to attack the constitutionality of the statute.
Is this not a harsh requirement to be imposed upon any law-abiding
citizen?
Herbert Jay Cohen.
TORT-INVASION OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY-
TELEPHONE MONITORING
Plaintiff subscriber sought to recover damages for alleged invasion
of her privacy resulting from the monitoring of her private telephone
conversations by the defendant telephone company who suspected plaintiff
was using such telephone for business purposes. Held, that no invasion
of privacy resulted since plaintiff suffered no damages, secrecy had been
maintained and there had been no publication except to her. Schmukler
.v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 116 N.E. 2d 819 (Ohio 1953).
The recognition of the personal right to privacy is comparatively
new in the law of torts,' and is not a subject covered by any of the
old commentators of the law. Relief in early cases was always based on
established theories of breach of confidence or trust, 2 breach of contract, 3
17. 40 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1949).
18. See note 16, supra.
I. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). The doctrine of the law of privacy, as such, was
first advanced in this country in an article written by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D.
Warren. This was the first United States comment advancing that we ought to recognize
it as a personal right and not one of property only.
2. Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)
(which led to enactment of a statutory right of privacy).
3. Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
